Krakow Quantum Informatics Seminar (KQIS) When the asymmetric cryptography will be outdated?

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June 16, 2020

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Science concerned with data communication and storage in secure and usually secret form.

- Cryptography secret writing (or other methods of hiding information)
- Cryptanalysis reading secret messages (without knowledge of encryption key).

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$\mathrm{Past} \to \mathrm{Today} \to \mathrm{Future}$

- Classic cryptography manipulation (substituting and permuting) of symbols (letters), codebooks.
- Modern cryptography computers and mathematics.
- Quantum cryptography quantum physics and quantum computers.
 - quantum cryptanalysis (Shor's algorithm),
 - key exchange methods,
 - detection of security breeches.
- **Postquantum cryptography** algorithms resistant to quantum cryptanalysis

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- Encryption/decryption and digital signature.
- Public key is used to encrypt and verify signature.
- Private key is used to decrypt and to create digital signature.

History of public-key cryptography

- Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol: 1976
- RSA algorithm: 1977 2
- ElGamal cryptosystem: 1985 3
- British Intelligence (GCHQ): 1970 1973 (classified for 25 years) 4

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Key exchange Diffie-Hellman-Merkle protocol

- First asymmetric cryptography algorithm (1976).
- Invented by Martin Hellman and Whitfield Diffi, and independently by Ralph Merkle.
- Only key exchange.
- Security based on the difficulty of calculating discrete logarithms (Discrete Logarithm Problem).

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- Alice and Bob now share a secret (number) $k_A = k_B = g^{ab} \mod n$.

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Eve (eavesdropper) knows $x, y, g, n \to \text{In order to know } a$ and b she must calculate discrete logarithm.

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Rivest-Shamir-Adelmann Cryptosystem

RSA Cryptosystem

• Rivest, Shamir, Adleman (1977 r.)



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RSA Cryptosystem

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• Security based on the difficulty of integer factorization.

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Key generation



• Choose two distinct large prime numbers $p \neq q$,

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Key generation

- Choose two distinct large prime numbers p i q,
- 2 Choose an integer e > 1 and e is coprime with (p-1)(q-1),

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Public key: (n, e).

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Public key: (n, e). Private key: (n, d).

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Encryption with RSA

- Message in divided into blocks of size not greater that key size (i.e. 2048 bits). Message is treated as integer number $m_i < n$.
- 2 Encryption:

 $c_i = m_i^e \mod n$

- Decryption: $m_i = c_i^d \mod n.$
- **③** RSA encryption in this form is insecure textbook RSA

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Receiver:

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- **③** Send message and signature to receiver

Receiver:

- Encrypts signature with public key: $sig_m^e = h_m^{ed}$
- ② Compute digest for received message.
- Compare $h_m^{ed} = h_m$ and verify the signature.

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- Some method are usable when key components fulfill some conditions.
- Quantum computing and Shor algorithm.

Why the RSA is so important?

- Symmetric cryptography is secure but how to exchange keys?
- Public-key cryptography is extremely slow.
- Solution:
 - public-key cryptography for key exchange/negotiation
 - **2** symmetric cryptography for data encryption/decryption.
- How to ensure that public key is correct?
 - Web of Trust like in PGP
 - 2 Public Key Infrastructure

Rivest-Shamir-Adelmann Cryptosystem

SSL/TLS protocol

• Secured Socket Layer

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- TLS 1.2, RFC 5246, Sierpień 2008.
- TLS 1.3, 2018.
- OpenSSL, GnuTLS open implementations

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Rivest-Shamir-Adelmann Cryptosystem

Handshake protocol w $\mathrm{SSL}/\mathrm{TLS}$



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Client/Server Hello messages

Client Hello

- Highest supported TLS version.
- 32B string: 4B[client's time] + 28B[random number] — will be used to generate session key.
- Session ID only if session is restarted.
- Supported cryptographic suite, np. TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH _AES_128_GCM_SHA256.

Server Hello

- ⇐.
- ⇐.
- Session ID:
 - new ID or
 - ID existing session or
 - null not supported
- Cryptographic suite. Server chooses the strongest.

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Cipher suites

TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256. ECDHE — Elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman for session key RSA — for certificates and digital signature. AES_128_GCM — AES encryption, 128b block, GCM (Galois/Counter Mode) cipher mode. SHA256 — digest function.

• Input date: integer N with d digits.

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- Best conventional algorithm has sub-exponential computational complexity: General Number Field Sieve (GNFS)
- Shor's algorithm has polynomial complexity



Shor algorithm

Peter Shor, 1994

- Classic (conventional) part: integer factorization to order-finding problem
- **2** Quantum part: solving order-finding problem

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Problem of order-finding

• Modulo operation:

$$a \equiv b \pmod{N}$$

two integers a, b are congruent modulo N if there is an integer k such that a - b = kn

• Let's $\mathbb{Z}_N = \{0, \dots N - 1\}$ be a set defined by operations modulo N

- Let's $\mathbb{Z}_N^* = \{a \in \mathbb{Z}_N : GCD(a, N) = 1\}$ be the multiplicative group of integers modulo N (appropriate operations are defined)
- For a ∈ Z^{*}_N the order of a in Z^{*}_N is the smallest positive integer r such that:

 $a^r \equiv 1 \pmod{N}$

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Problem of order-finding: example

Let's N = 15 and a = 7: $7^x \mod N$

•
$$7^1 \pmod{15} = 7$$

- $7^2 \pmod{15} = 4$
- $7^3 \pmod{15} = 13$
- $7^4 \pmod{15} = 1 \pmod{15}$
- $7^5 \pmod{15} = 16807 \pmod{15} = 7$
- $7^6 \pmod{15} = 117649 \pmod{15} = 4$
- $7^7 \pmod{15} = 823543 \pmod{15} = 13$
- $7^8 \pmod{15} = 5764801 \pmod{15} = 1$ Once again!

then order of 7 in \mathbb{Z}_{15}^* is r = 4:

Let's denote the above expression as function $f^7(x) = 7^x \pmod{15}$. It is periodical: $f^7(x+4) = f^7(x)$.

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• Let's assume that N has two prime factors p_1 i p_2 : $N = p_1 \times p_2$

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● Let's assume that N has two prime factors p₁ i p₂: N = p₁ × p₂
● Pick a random integer a: 2 ≥ a ≥ N − 1.

- Let's assume that N has two prime factors p_1 i p_2 : $N = p_1 \times p_2$
- 2 Pick a random integer $a: 2 \ge a \ge N 1$.
- Let's assume that GCD(N, a) = 1.

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- If r is odd go back to step 2.

Rivest-Shamir-Adelmann Cryptosystem

From integer factorization order-finding problem t

$\bullet \ a^r \equiv 1 \pmod{N}$

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a^r ≡ 1 (mod N)
 Let's reformulate: a^r - 1 = (a^{r/2} - 1)(a^{r/2} + 1)

- $\bullet \ a^r \equiv 1 \pmod{N}$
- **2** Let's reformulate: $a^r 1 = (a^{\frac{r}{2}} 1)(a^{\frac{r}{2}} + 1)$
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- Let's assume that $a^{\frac{r}{2}} + 1$ is not multiply of N too.
- **(a** $a^{\frac{r}{2}} \pm 1$ are not multiply of N but they product is.
- Prime factors: $p_1(p_2) = GCD(N, a^{\frac{r}{2}} \pm 1)$
Shor algorithm

Fourier Transform: retrieve from periodic signal all frequencies
Quantum Fourier Transform (QFT) does the same

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Shor's algorithm in practice

Number	# of factors	# of qubits needed	Algorithm	Year implemented	Implemented without prior knowledge of solution
15	2	8	Shor	2001 [2]	×
	2	8	Shor	2007 [3]	×
	2	8	Shor	2007 [3]	×
	2	8	Shor	2009 [5]	×
	2	8	Shor	2012 [6]	x
21	2	10	Shor	2012 [7]	×
143	2	4	minimization	2012 [1]	\checkmark
56153	2	4	minimization	2012 [1]	\checkmark
291311	2	6	minimization	not yet	1
175	3	3	minimization	not yet	\checkmark

Table 5: Quantum factorization records

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What about other public-key cryptosystems?

- Diffie-Hellman protocol, ElGamal and DSA: Peter W. Shor, Polynomial-Time Algorithms for Prime Factorization and Discrete Logarithms on a Quantum Computer
- Elliptic-Curve Cryptography (ECC), ECDH (Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman), ECDSA (Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm): Quantum Resource Estimates for Computing Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithms, Shor's discrete logarithm quantum algorithm for elliptic curves

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Future of cryptography

- Crypto-agility
- Post-quantum cryptography:
 - lattice-based cryptography
 - hash-based cryptography
 - correction codes-based cryptography
 - multivariate cryptography

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